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The Lima Call for Climate Action,1 agreed by over 190 
countries including Australia, outlines the international 
community’s key benchmarks and expectations for new 
post-2020 emissions reductions targets. The Australian 
Government has committed to sharing it’s indicative 
post 2020 emissions target by mid-year. It is clear that 
international expectations will be for targets stronger, 
indeed much stronger, than the current minimum 2020 
target of 5 per cent below 2000 levels by 2020 
emissions reductions target. 
The Climate Change Authority (CCA) is due to release a 
draft report on future emissions reductions targets next 
month. This research brief highlights a key aspect of 
The Climate Institute’s submission, which is available 
here.  
Paragraph 10 of the Lima Call for Climate Action states: 
“…each Party’s intended nationally determined 
contribution towards achieving the objective of the 
Convention as set out in its Article 2 will represent a 
progression beyond the current undertaking of that 
Party”. (Emphasis added). This has specific implications 
for Australia’s post-2020 emissions reductions goal, 
which the government is currently developing. 
The first key word in this paragraph is ‘progression’. 
This is broadly interpreted internationally to mean each 
target that a country takes on will be more ambitious 
than its last target and no backsliding on commitments 
will be undertaken. This is the first step towards an 
important evolution in the international framework as it 
starts to enshrine an ongoing cycle which sees 
countries increasing their emissions reductions 
contributions over time.2 
The second key element is the reference to Article 2 of 
the Climate Convention.  This currently defined as 
limiting global warming to less than 2°C above 
preindustrial levels.  Progression is clearly indicated to 
be in service of this goal, which requires a significant 
acceleration of emission reduction efforts beyond 2020. 
For this reason, progression should be interpreted as 
increased ambition not just in terms of absolute 
emission reductions, but also in the rate of emission 
reductions. In other words, countries’ targets should 
not just increase the amount of emissions reduced, but 
the speed at which this takes place.  
The post-2020 targets indicated by the USA, European 
Union, and Switzerland (Figure 1.) all demonstrate 
progression in the rate of emission reduction. On 
average initial post-2020 targets increase their annual 
rate of from less than 2 per cent per year between 2010 
and 2020 to around 3 per cent a year from 2020 to 
2025. While China, as an emerging economy, is not 
directly comparable with Australia, its initial post-2020 
target also requires a substantial acceleration of 
decarbonisation, so meets this interpretation of the 
progression requirement.3 
A less justifiable interpretation of progression might 
consider absolute terms only. This would mean that any 
number even slightly above the country’s previous 
target could be argued to be progression. For example, 
Australia took on a 2025 target of 7 per cent reduction 
or 2030 target of 10 per cent, this would be a higher 
number than the minimum 5 per cent 2020 target in 
absolute terms, but would not accelerate the rate of 
emissions reductions (Australia is reducing emissions 
by about 0.5 per cent per year, if it continued this rate 
after 2020 it would meet a 7 per cent target in 2025). 
The Government could argue that this is stronger that 
the current minimum 2020 emissions reduction target, 
and therefore fulfils the requirement for progression, 
even though it does not accelerate emissions 
reductions. 
This latter approach is unlikely to be credible 
internationally. Most other advanced economies 
comparable with Australia are not only increasing their 
absolute emissions reductions but also the rate at 
which these are occurring, and it would not be 
consistent with Australia’s fairly contributing the agreed 
global objective of limiting warming to less than 2°C. 
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Key Points from The Climate Institute’s submission to the CCA 
+ The Climate Institute supports the Authority’s previous 
recommendation that Australia should set a coordinated 
set of short‐term targets and long‐term goals, based on a 
2010‐2050 carbon budget consistent with a fair 
contribution to limiting warming to less than 2°C above 
pre‐industrial levels (“2°C goal”). 
+ Carbon budgets, in particular, remain central to stable and 
effective policy development. The development and use of 
carbon budgets should be guided by risk management 
principles which give at least a 75 per cent chance 
achieving the 2°C goal. 
+ Australia’s climate change policy is suffering from a lack of 
a long‐term view. To meet the 2°C goal, the ultimate 
destination or strategic objective of climate policy is the 
progressive phase‐out of emissions to net zero levels (and 
below), or ‘decarbonisation’. Ultimately, only a policy with 
a decarbonisation strategy for achieving net zero emissions 
and below will provide a stable and sustainable platform 
for long term investment. 
+ The Climate Change Authority should be clear in 
distinguishing national targets from any policy related 
sectoral impacts. The level of Australia's post‐2020 target 
is not the determinant of its net cost or benefit, or of its 
impact, on specific economic sectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+ The Authority should explicitly consider the economic, 
environmental and social risks associated with meeting 
only the minimum 5 per cent target, including being out of 
step with comparable countries, and requiring a more 
disruptive effort to later meet a 2°C goal trajectory. 
+ The Lima Call for Climate Action outlines key benchmarks 
and expectations for new post‐2020 contributions. By 
setting a high standard in the communication of its own 
target, Australia will be in a stronger position to expect the 
same of other nations. This will be particularly important in 
the context of encouraging ambitious, transparent and 
accountable actions from emerging economies. 
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Figure 1: Annual rates of emissions reductions to achieve national targets. The figure shows that, with the 
exception of Japan, Australia’s current rate of emissions reductions to achieve its minimum target is very low compared 
with other advanced economies. It also shows that most countries’ initial post-2020 targets represent increases in their 
annual rates of emissions reductions. The implications of the targets recommended for Australia by the Climate Change 
Authority (CCA) and the rates of emissions reductions for past targets are also shown for comparison. 
Notes: Data sources from country submissions to UNFCCC. Data includes land use, land use change and forestry emissions. 
Australia’s 2008-2012 Kyoto target allowed it to increase emissions. Japan’s increased emissions target to 2020 is due to the 
impact of the 2011 tsunami and subsequent closure of nuclear reactors. 
